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Introduction 
 
Foreign affairs have always been a sensitive issue in the European Union. Member states 
consider the right to have an independent foreign affairs policy as something which touches 
directly on  their sovereignty. Therefore, foreign policy was for a long time a policy area 
which remained outside the official EU-framework. This changed with the introduction of the 
Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993. The CFSP has given the EU an 
institutional framework in which the EU could coordinate foreign policy on an 
intergovernmental basis. Member states retain full sovereignty over their foreign affairs as 
any decision on a European level is taken by unanimity. This means that the national interests 
of each of the 28 member states within the European Union has to be taken into account. 
However, member states do not always have the same national interests in their foreign policy. 
This is caused by the many political divisions within the European Union (EU). Examples of 
these political divisions are; neutral vs. non-neutral states; large states vs. small states; new 
members vs. old members; different threat perceptions; regional groupings like north vs. 
south; and member states with a seat in the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC) vs. 
those who do not have one. These different divisions create a plethora of interests for member 
states which do not always converge. They can quite possibly diverge and create substantive 
gaps in the way member states act in foreign affairs. This seriously hampers the EU’s ability 
to speak with one voice.  
One such an example is the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). The MEPP is the 
term used for the efforts to come to a peace agreement between the state of Israel and various 
Arabian countries. The MEPP has been high on the agenda of the European Union since the 
start of foreign affairs cooperation in 1970. The reason why this has been such an important 
issue in European foreign affairs policy is that the Middle-East can be considered as Europe’s 
‘backyard’. Europe maintains close political and cultural ties with the region. Moreover, 
security issues such as illegal migration and terrorism constitute a potential threat to European 
security. Its close proximity to Europe as well as European dependence on oil from the region 
makes the Middle-East a region of great importance to Europe.  
However, while the MEPP has been one of the focal points of European foreign affairs, 
the EU has had difficulties in forming a clear and coherent stance. The reason for this was that 
key EU member states such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) have 
diverging foreign policy positions on the MEPP. These member states are of intrinsic value to 
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the EU and therefore have much influence in European decision making. These diverging 
foreign policy positions seriously hampered the EU’s effectiveness and credibility as a partner 
in the MEPP.   
Yet the foreign policies of France, Germany and the UK regarding the MEPP have 
recently begun to show convergence. This increases the possibility to come up with a more 
coherent and effective position for the EU in the negotiations. One explanation for this 
convergence which is being put forward is that the foreign policies of the Big Three are being 
‘Europeanized’. The term Europeanization has a host of meanings but for this particular topic, 
it refers to the gradual adoption of common European positions and ideas in foreign affairs.  
As such, this thesis will research if the convergence of the positions of France, Germany and 
the UK has been caused by Europeanization or that it was caused by domestic or geopolitical 
variables.  
One of the main factors which could be a driver of the Europeanization of the 
positions of the Big Three regarding the MEPP is the introduction and subsequent expansion 
of the CFSP. The CFSP was introduced in the wake of the Yugoslavia Crisis with the aim to 
create a more coherent European foreign policy. The EU’s slow and uncoordinated response 
during the disintegration of Yugoslavia had made it clear that the EU needed to be more 
effective in foreign affairs. The CFSP provides an intergovernmental framework for the EU’s 
member states to develop and coordinate foreign policy.  
Subsequent treaties have expanded the CFSP with the aim to increase its effectiveness 
and international visibility by introducing a high ranking envoy for foreign affairs, the High 
Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). Additionally, the 
EU’s own diplomatic network, the European External Action Service (EEAS), was introduced. 
These developments have given the EU a voice and a face in foreign affairs. While the CFSP 
is intergovernmental, the expansion of the EU’s foreign affairs instruments mentioned above 
could have had a positive effect on the Europeanization of foreign policy. In this thesis, I will 
have special attention for the Big Three’s positions after the introduction of each of these 
improvements. If they show convergence after these improvements, it will be very likely that 
this is caused by Europeanization. I will thereby closely consider if such convergence is not 
caused by domestic or geopolitical components instead of Europeanization. Due to the limited 
length of this dissertation, the focus of this dissertation will be on the peace negotiations 
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. However, as the Arab states have a significant 
impact on the Peace Process, occasional references to their role will be made. 
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 France, the UK and Germany are good cases for comparison. First, they have different 
political and social systems. Secondly, they constitute large states within the European Union 
which have the capability to decisively influence decision making in the EU. Thirdly, they 
have different views on the Middle-East peace process. Germany is very careful in criticising 
Israel as it feels it has a moral debt after the atrocities committed to the Jews under the Third 
Reich. France and the UK, on the other hand, used to rule over areas in the Middle-East as 
part of the mandate system created after the First World War. France feels an obligation to 
help the Arab population in the region whereas the UK is generally more supportive of Israel. 
It is clear that France, the UK and Germany have different interests in the area. But how do 
the differences between these prominent European nations translate themselves into a CFSP 
on the MEPP? 
 The structure of this thesis is as follows. In the first chapter, the pros and cons of 
multiple case study research will be discussed. Chapter II examines the theory of 
Europeanization. Chapter III, IV and V relate to several components which have significant 
influence on policy-making of the Big Three regarding the MEPP. After this, the EU’s 
position and those of France, the UK and Germany in five landmark events in the Israeli-
Palestine conflict will be discussed. In my conclusion, I will discuss what the impact of 
France, Germany and the UK has been on the CFSP regarding the MEPP. Furthermore, I will 
discuss what the impact of Europeanization on the MEPP was and how it can influence 
European foreign policy elsewhere.   
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I. Methodology  
 
In order to evaluate if Europeanization of the foreign policies of France, Germany and the UK 
has occurred regarding the MEPP, I have conducted multiple-case study research. Yin 
describes case study research as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”1  As will be clear in the next section, 
Europeanization is such a phenomenon of which the boundaries between Europeanization and 
context are not clear. The problem with Europeanization is that: 
 
The EU may or may not produce domestic effects in many different ways. It is easy to 
compile a long list of ways in which this can theoretically happen, but it is difficult to pin 
down the exact conditions under which Europeanization occurs.2  
 
Case study research will be especially useful when researching if and how processes have 
been affected by Europeanization. Can Europeanization be seen as an independent process 
which has affected the national foreign policies of EU member states or does it depend on one 
or more intervening variables? It is clear, then, that to establish causality, by isolating 
Europeanization from other variables, will be one of the greatest challenges of this thesis. 
Failing to do so could lead to unintended bias.  
 Case studies can be exploratory, explanatory, or descriptive and usually consist of one 
or a limited amount of cases.3 Most case studies try to answer “how”, “what” and sometimes 
“why” something has happened. Whereas case studies which answer “what” or “how-
questions” are of a descriptive nature,  “why-questions”  are typically of  explanatory nature.4 
Some researchers state that descriptive case studies are inferior to explanatory cases. However, 
Flyvbjerg is quick to dismiss such notions. According to him, a solely descriptive case study 
can help open up new avenues of information and increase the strength of other scientific 
research.5 This thesis falls in the explanatory category as it aims to determine causality. It tries 
                                                           
1
 Yin, Robert Kuo-zuir, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Los Angeles 1994) 18. 
2
 C. Radaelli, Europeanization: The Challenge of Establishing Causality. In: T. Exadaktylos and C. Radaelli (eds) 
Research Design in European Studies: Establishing Causality in Europeanization (Basingstoke and New York 
2012) 2. 
3
 Hammersley, Martyn & Gomm, Roger (2008)  Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts (London 2008) 4. 
4
 Yin, Robert Kuo-zuir, Case Study Research, 7-9. 
5
 Flyvbjerg, Bent, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, Qualitative Inquiry 12.2 (2006) 227. 
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to answer whether changes in the foreign policies of France, Germany and the UK have been 
caused by Europeanization. 
There are some disadvantages to case studies.  A common heard criticism of the case 
study method is that it lacks the ability to generalize conclusions due to its dependence on one 
or a limited amount of cases. However, the ability to generalize, better understood as 
‘generalizability’, has a different meaning in qualitative research compared to quantitative 
research. In quantitative research, researchers use large samples. When statistical analysis 
shows that it is very unlikely that the quantitative study’s results are caused by chance, it is 
deemed possible to generalize them. However, due to its small number of research samples, 
qualitative case study research is deemed unfit to generalize. Nonetheless, Yin argues that 
generalization from either single- or multiple-case studies is based on theory instead of large 
samples. By replicating cases and establishing patterns which can be linked to the overarching 
theory, multiple-case studies can enrich and support earlier results.6 This increases the overall 
strength of the method. 
The last heard criticism is that case study methods can cause a bias towards 
establishing causality. While this is an issue which can affect any method, it is deemed more 
likely to occur in qualitative methods than in quantitative methods as the former allow more 
room for the researchers’ own subjective judgment. 7  In order to make the chance of 
attributing the wrong causes to the Europeanization of French, German and British foreign 
policy, I have divided the interfering variables in two categories: domestic and geopolitical. 
These variables can influence the foreign policies of France, Germany and the UK to either 
converge or diverge from each other. By isolating these variables, I will enable myself to 
determine if domestic and geopolitical developments were the cause of change in the foreign 
policies of France, Germany and the UK, or that it was caused by Europeanization. Already a 
few interfering variables can be identified; Germany’s legacy from the Holocaust and its Cold 
War constrains; France’s sizable Muslim population and its historical ties with the region; the 
UK’s ‘special relation’ with the United States (US) and its historical ties with the Middle East.  
I have chosen the cases of France, Germany and the UK because they are of intrinsic 
value to the shaping of the CFSP. Their economic weight, military capacity, demographics 
and diplomatic capability allows the ‘Big Three’ to shape policies in the EU. This is 
especially the case when the three act united and push for a policy. Conversely, if the three 
cannot agree, it is unlikely that a certain policy is adopted by the EU. The leading role of the 
                                                           
6
 Yin, Robert Kuo-zuir, Case Study Research,  
7
 Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-study research’ 234. 
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Big Three can be seen in a wide range of policy areas but is especially prominent in the CFSP. 
The Big Three, which own much of the relevant assets in this policy area, play an informal 
leadership role within it.8 This allows them to play a major role in the shaping of  the CFSP.9 
Moreover, due to their resources and networks, the Big Three aren’t limited to cooperation 
within the European framework. They can still be independent actors in foreign policy.  
The Big Three have very different strategic cultures and priorities. The UK is a 
northern country which has a strong ‘Atlanticist’ tradition which is focussed on British ties 
with the US. France, on the other hand, is a Mediterranean country with an outspoken realist 
foreign policy tradition. Lastly, Germany is a northern European country with a strong 
civilian power tradition. Because of these very different backgrounds, one would expect that 
the foreign policies of the Big Three regarding the MEPP are incompatible. However, recent 
years have witnessed a convergence of their positions. This very interesting development 
allows me to apply the ‘most different systems’ case study design. In such a  design, two or 
more cases are different on a wide range of explanatory variables except the dependent 
variable. This will allow me to eliminate irrelevant factors and show the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables.10  
 
  
                                                           
8
 Stephan Lehne, ‘The Big Three in EU foreign policy’, The Carnegie Papers (July 2012) 3. 
9
 Gross, E (2009) The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy. Continuity and Change in European Crisis 
Management 
10
 Seawright, Jason and Gerring, John. Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research. A Menu of 
Qualitative and Quantitative Options’, Political Research Quarterly 61. 2 (2008) 304-306. 
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II. Theoretical Framework 
 
One of the earliest definitions of Europeanization was made by Robert Ladrech. According to 
Ladrech, Europeanization “is an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of 
politics to the decree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy making.” 11  In this definition, a clear 
constructivist approach can be discovered. Europeanization does not only change the way 
actors operate but also how they think.12  However, numerous researchers have come up with 
different definitions of Europeanization theory.13  This plethora of different definitions of 
Europeanization has had a negative impact on the credibility of Europeanization as a viable 
theory.14 Critics state that Europeanization is ‘poorly and confusingly defined’.15 This has let 
some researchers to question the usability of Europeanization as a research theory. 16  
However, Europeanization theory should be seen as an umbrella name for many different 
kinds or Europeanization. Just like that no theory would be adequate for every subject area, 
not every Europeanization theory fits every research question. The multifaceted aspects of 
European integration and cooperation render it impossible to use a single theory. Muller and 
Alecu de Flers therefore state that Europeanization is “not a theory but rather a conceptual 
framework that draws on a range of theoretical and explanatory schemes”.17 Europeanization 
concepts have to take into account that different policy areas require different 
Europeanization approaches.   
For the Europeanization of foreign policy, three lenses or dimensions can be identified: 
the uploading of national foreign policy preferences to the European level (bottom-up 
Europeanization); the downloading of policy concepts and ideas of the EU’s CFSP and other 
European foreign affairs actors to the national level (top-down Europeanization); and cross-
                                                           
11
 Ladrech, Robert,  ‘Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies 32.1 (1994) 69.  
12
 Schimmelfennig and Thomas 2009; 
13
 Tsardanidis, Charalambos and Stavridis, Stelios. ‘The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy: a critical 
appraisal’, Journal of European Integration 27.2 (2005) 217-239. 
14
 Olsen, Johan P. ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization’ Journal of Common Market Studies 
40.5 (2002)  921. 
15
 Mair, Peter, ‘The Europeanization dimension’, Journal of European Public Policy 11.2 (2004) 338-339. 
16
 Moumoutzis, Kyriakos, ‘Still Fashionable Yet Useless? Addressing Problems with Research on the 
Europeanization of Foreign Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies 49.3 (2011) 607-629. 
17
 Nicole Alecu de Flers and Patrick Müller, ‘Dimensions and Mechanisms of the 
Europeanization of Member State Foreign Policy: State of the Art and New Research Avenues’, Journal of 
European Integration 34.1 (2014)  6. 
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loading in which member states influence each other’s national foreign policies (or horizontal 
Europeanization).18  
The uploading of member states’ national preferences to the European level has 
several important advantages for member states. First of all, by operating through the CFSP, 
member states gain some influence over other member states’ foreign policies. In addition to 
this, influence on the CFSP can increase their influence in the world as they can operate 
through the EU. Last of all, member states can use the CFSP as a cover to assert influence in 
foreign policy areas which are deemed too sensitive.19 Germany, for example, uses European 
channels to condemn the construction of Israeli settlements in Palestine territory. Another 
incentive for member states is that by uploading their national preferences to the European 
level, they align European foreign policy more with their national preferences. This 
minimizes the costs of downloading these European preferences to the national level.20  
 The downloading dimension of Europeanization relates to the influence EU policy and 
institutions exert on member states’ national policies. For the area of foreign policy, the 
downloading dimension has different consequences. In most policy areas,  member states are 
forced to Europeanize through binding mechanisms and hard law. An example of this is the 
internal market in which the EU has exclusive competences. In this area, the EU can compel 
member states to adopt policies. Nonetheless, foreign affairs constitute a very different case 
then economic politics in terms of downloading policy. The CFSP is one of the few remaining 
policy areas which has largely remained intergovernmental. Decisions are taken by consensus. 
Coordination of foreign policy is done through non-binding instruments like the open method 
of coordination (OMC). This causes the influence of the EU in the field of foreign policy to 
be very weak. There is no way that the EU can coerce member states to change their foreign 
policy. This weak influence is compounded by strategic and historical variables which 
continue to carry great weight. The weak coercive power of the EU was reflected in the EU’s 
failure to come up with a common position on the war in Yugoslavia or the American 
invasion of Iraq.  
                                                           
18
 Patrick Müller, ‘The Europeanization of France’s foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict: from 
leadership to accommodation’, European Security 22.1 (2013) 115. And  Bulmer, Simon J. and Radaelli, Claudio 
M. ‘The Europeanisation of National Policy?’ Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation (No 1/2004) and Alister 
Miskimmon, Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, between 
Europeanisation and national adaptation (Houndmills 2007) 192-196. 
19
 Reuben Wong, ‘The Europeanization of Foreign policy’ in: Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.) 
International Relations and the European Union (Oxford 2005) 147-148. 
20
 Börzel, T. ‘Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 40.2 (2002) 193. 
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However, this does not mean that Europeanization doesn’t take place in foreign policy. 
This is not so much the downloading dimension of Europeanization but the cross-loading 
dimension of Europeanization. 21 Since the inception of the European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) in 1970, member states have had a forum on which they could exchange and 
coordinate foreign policy. Member states learn from each other and this practice can lead to 
cross-fertilization by which shared positions can gradually develop. The intergovernmental 
character of the CFSP doesn’t mean that there is no top-down influence. Such has been 
evident with states which have recently joined the EU who had to adjust their foreign policies 
to the existing positions of the CFSP.22  
  It should be noted that the uploading, downloading and cross-loading dimensions are 
all intrinsically linked to each other. Member states constitute the building blocks of the EU 
and the EU has become an integral part of the member states. Therefore, change of domestic 
policies brought about by the EU can feedback to the European level and vice versa. This 
circular movement of Europeanization complicates research of Europeanization, in particular 
the study of causality; has a member state Europeanized or has it made EU policy align more 
closely to its national policies? To solve this issue, Müller argues that Europeanization is best 
researched over long periods of time. In this way, the dynamics of Europeanization are the 
most pronounced. In addition to this, it makes it easier to discern the influences of internal 
and external factors on the Europeanization. 23  Another issue which can complicate the 
research of Europeanization is the fact that Europeanization is not a linear process. There will 
be moments that national foreign policies convergence but there will also be instances of 
resistance or divergence. Divergence and resistance may be especially likely in the domain of 
foreign policy. Historically, member states have refused to let the EU impose extensive 
constraints on their foreign policy. This can result in a situation that a member state falls back 
on its national resources or other channels of foreign policy when it opposes decisions or the 
lack of decisions in the CFSP. This re-nationalization of foreign policy is easier for larger 
member states as they have the resources to act independent.24  
 
 
                                                           
21
 Bulmer and Radaelli,  ‘The Europeanisation of National Policy?’ 8-9. 
22
 Nicole Alecu de Flers and Patrick Müller, ‘Dimensions and Mechanisms of the 
Europeanization of Member State Foreign Policy: State of the Art and New Research Avenues’, Journal of 
European Integration 34.1 (2014)  12. 
23
 Patrick Müller, ‘The Europeanization of France’s foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict: from 
leadership to accommodation’, European Security 22.1 (2013) 114. 
24
 Müller, ‘The Europeanization of France’s foreign policy’, 116-117. 
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Europeanization in international relations theory 
I have already mentioned that Europeanization borrows heavily from constructivism. 
However, it should be noted that there are also other theories that explain member states’ 
foreign policies. First of all, according to realists, behaviour of member states is influenced by 
their desire to protect themselves in an anarchic world. There is no over-arching organization 
which protects them. Therefore, states have to take care of themselves. This need for self-help 
explains several attributes of states; states act in their own interests; they want to maintain 
their autonomy and sovereignty; they want to enlarge their capabilities vis-à-vis other states 
and they strive to maintain a balance of power between states.25 This desire for autonomy and 
sovereignty collides with international institutions like the European Union in which states 
have delegated some autonomy and sovereignty. Waltz resolves this issue by stating that 
international institutions are instruments for states – institutions only exert as much power as 
is given to them by states. This power is only delegated to them when states feel that there is 
something to gain from cooperation. Therefore the CFSP can be seen as an instrument for 
member states to achieve common goals.26  
 In the case of cooperation on foreign policy, the member states of the EU have 
gradually delegated more power to the CFSP. Pilegaard and Kluth state that the main reason 
why France, the UK and Germany have agreed to expand the CFSP is that they were faced 
with continuing decline of their relative power. With relative greater capabilities than smaller 
member states, common foreign policy set by the CFSP would be greatly influenced by them. 
However, Pilegaard and Kluth forego on the idea that the European Union itself is a multi-
polar institution. A state with great capabilities has to take into account the interests of other 
states with big capabilities.27 In their concluding remarks, Pilegaard and Kluth argue that it is 
increasingly more difficult to apply neo-realist theory on the European integration process as 
member states move away from policy measures which can be identified with international 
anarchy. Wagner continues this line of thought to show the limits of neo-realism in the 
context of European integration. He argues that the reunification of Germany should have 
caused Germany to lose interest in the strengthening of foreign policy cooperation because its 
relative power vis-à-vis France and the UK had increased. However, this has not been the 
                                                           
25
 Baylis, Smith & Owens (Ed.), The globalization of world politics (Oxford 2008), 102-103 
26
 Wolfgang Wagner, Unilateral Foreign Policy Capacities and State Preferences on CFSP, Rationalism´s 
Contribution to Explaining German, French and British Policies Towards CFSP, (Geneva 2002) 13-14.. 
27
 Jess Pilegaard & Michael Kluth, ‘To Be or Not to Be, A Neorealist Interpretation of the EU’s External Action 
Service’, paper presented at the 12th biennial conference of the European Union studies association, Boston 
(Roskilde 2011) 9-10. 
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case.28 It is therefore getting increasingly difficult to explain European cooperation in foreign 
affairs through a neo-realist lens as it can only explain a very limited area of the development 
of the CFSP.  
Neo-liberal institutionalism is more suitable when researching European cooperation 
in foreign affairs. Neo-liberal institutionalism corresponds with quite some points of neo-
realism. However, it attributes more importance to international institutions. Neo-liberal 
institutionalism argues that states are willing to give up some sovereignty to international 
institutions as international institutions can help control anarchy. This provides states with 
more security. Keohane and Nye argue that in this way, a close interdependence of states and 
non-state actors has been developed in international relations. This interdependence is also 
present in common foreign affairs.29 Musu states that this interdependence is strengthened due 
to internal and external factors. These factors cause member states’ foreign polices to 
converge. 30  However, some national preferences continue to be of great importance for 
individual member states. These can act as a counterweight of greater cohesion. This doesn’t 
necessarily mean that European foreign policy becomes less or more effective. Koutrakos 
argues that the widening membership and the accompanying interests create a more flexible 
EU. An example of this were the negotiations of France, the UK and Germany with Iran. 
These negotiations were outside the scope of the CFSP but the parties later invited the High 
Representative (HR) to join the negotiations.31 This flexibility reflects the real nature of the 
CFSP in my opinion. The main causes of this flexibility are the sui generis character of the 
CFSP and of the EU as a whole, and the fact that both the CFSP and EU are still developing. 
Neo-realism does only explain why states created the EU in the first place, it doesn’t 
give a satisfying answer why we maintain it. Neo-liberalism only emphasizes the influence of 
institutions but not the reinforcing interplay between the member states and the EU. 
Constructivism on the other hand, focuses too much on the influence from social factors on 
foreign policy whereas I think the main interaction is between the member states and the EU. 
As I want to narrow my research down to the interaction between the EU’s CFSP and France, 
the UK and Germany, the concept of Europeanization would fit the best. It will be used to 
                                                           
28
 Wagner, Unilateral Foreign Policy Capacities and State Preferences, 24-25. 
29
 Baylis, Smith & Owens (Ed.), The globalization of world politics (Oxford 2008) 132. 
30
 Costanza Musu, ‘European Foreign Policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of ‘Converging Parallels’?’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review 8 (2003) 35–49. 
31
 Panos Koutrakos, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy: Looking back, Thinking forward’, in: 50 Years of 
the European Treaties : Looking back and Thinking forward, ed. Michael Dougan and Samantha Currie (Oxford 
2009) 177-178. 
13 
 
study the influence of member states’ foreign policy on the CFSP, its ultimate effects and its 
probable feedback on the member states. 
  
14 
 
III. France 
 
In this chapter I will discuss the variables which influence French policy towards the MEPP. 
The current French foreign policy has its roots in a period long before the inception of the 
CFSP and they still have considerable influence on French foreign policy. First, the legacy of 
General De Gaulle on French foreign policy will be discussed. His ideas of how France 
should act on the world stage still resonate in French foreign policy today. After that, the 
extensive powers of the French President in French foreign affairs will be examined. The third 
issue which will be discussed is the French concept of secularism called laïcité. It is one of 
the cornerstones of French society and has repercussions for French policy towards the MEPP. 
Finally, France’s economic ties with the Middle East will be covered.  
 
 
The foreign policy tradition of the Fifth Republic: in search of grandeur  
One man who has had a huge impact on the French state and French foreign policy in 
particular was general Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970). De Gaulle saw France as an 
exceptional country. Not so much because of its long history of greatness or its existence as 
one of the first nation-states in the world, but more because of its special role in the world. 
Since the French Revolution, France had been a carrier of universal values. It considered itself 
destined to spread the universal values of liberté, égalité and  fraternité to the rest of the 
world.32 However, when De Gaulle took office in the Elysée in 1958, France was only a 
shadow of its former self. Two World Wars and several failed attempts to reassert French 
power in North Africa and South-East Asia had reduced France to a middle class power. 
Moreover, the on-going Algerian war of Independence had isolated France internationally.  
Advocating French exceptionalism, De Gaulle looked for ways to restore France as a 
great-power. In order to achieve this, he considered it essential for France to regain its 
grandeur, which “involves the self-conscious defence of the independence, honour and rank 
of the nation”.33 According to De Gaulle, France had failed to reach its full potential due to its 
social and political divisions. These rifts in French society had led to the fall of the Third and 
Fourth Republic.34 The only way to strengthen the moral and political unity of France was 
                                                           
32
 Marcel H. van Herpen, ‘Chirac’s Gaullism’, The Romanian Journal of European Affairs 4:1 (2004)  68. 
33
  Daniel J. Mahoney , De Gaulle: Statesmanship, Grandeur, and Modern Democracy (Westport 1996) 16-17. 
34
 Timo Behr, ‘Enduring Differences? France, Germany and Europe’s Middle East Dilemma’, Journal of 
European Integration 30:1 (2008) 84. 
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through the pursuit of grandeur.35  In international relations, he envisaged France to be an 
independent great-power free from constraints.36 However, by the time De Gaulle came to 
power, the Cold War was in full swing, dividing the world in two power-blocs. De Gaulle saw 
this as a threat to the world. The world would either be engulfed into a destructive war 
between the two superpowers or it would be carved up between them.37 Only by a proper 
balance of power between rival states would international peace be maintained.38 As a true 
realist, De Gaulle did not believe that international organizations like the UN could maintain 
international peace. Only nation-states could influence international relations. Therefore, De 
Gaulle sought to manoeuvre France between the two superpowers as a third power. This 
would not only undermine the bipolar world by providing an alternative pole of power, it 
would also allow France to regain great-power status. This in turn would provide France with 
grandeur. In sum, De Gaulle combined typical realist perceptions with the idea of French 
exceptionalism and grandeur into his own distinct foreign policy vision called Gaullism.  
 French aspirations for a bigger role for France on the global stage had repercussions 
for French regional policy in the Middle East. In order to become an alternative pole of power, 
France had to become a champion of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). The NAM was a 
group of states who were not formally aligned with one of the superpowers. Many of the 
NAM’s members were former colonies which had recently gained their independence. Their 
struggle for independence had resulted in high levels of nationalism. However, French efforts 
to align itself with the NAM were ineffective as long as France remained a colonial power. To 
make France attractive for Third World nationalism, De Gaulle sought an honourable end to 
the Algerian War. In the Middle East, France sought to counter Soviet and US influence and 
to promote its own influence by developing the politique arabe. This policy sought to develop 
close contacts with Arab states and promote Arab nationalism. 39  Arab nationalism was 
strongly represented in the NAM and fiercely opposed Anglo-Saxon hegemony. It was 
therefore seen as a natural ally to France. However, in order to attain closer ties with such 
countries, France had to downgrade its relations with Israel. Many Arab states were distrustful 
of France. During the existence of the Fourth Republic, France had been a close ally of Israel. 
It had assisted Israel during the Suez Crisis and was the only country to deliver high tech 
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offensive weaponry to Israel.40 This had been a major source of discontent under the Arab 
states.  
The realignment of French foreign policy was accomplished in a very short timeframe. 
In 1962, the Evian accords were signed, bringing an end to the Algerian War. This greatly 
improved the relations between France and the Arab world. French realignment was 
completed during the 1967 Six-Day War when France refused to support Israel. From that 
moment on, France was the main European partner of the Arab world. The politique arabe 
would become the main pillar of French foreign policy in the region and had a profound 
impact on France’s position in the MEPP. France became one of the main  proponents of the 
advancement of Palestinian national rights. In addition to this, France stressed that all 
involved parties should adhere to international law and UN resolutions.41 In this framework, it 
also recognized the Israeli’s right of a secure homeland.  
The politique arabe should be seen as a tool for France to increase its international 
standing by ensuring a special role in the region. In addition to this, the politique arabe 
provided France with a new mission in the region following the period of decolonization. This 
new international role following the time of decolonization, continued to play a big role in 
French foreign policy during the Cold War. French opposition to the domination of the two 
superpowers meant that it often competed with US policies. This was reflected in French 
policy towards the MEPP which was often pro-Arab and critical of Israel. France advocated 
the resolution of the conflict through multilateral negotiations, thereby envisaging a 
prominent role for the UN. As a permanent member of the UNSC, France could exert 
considerable influence in the negotiations.42  
France also tried to exert influence through Europe by uploading its national 
preferences to the European level. In this way, Europe would act as a power multiplier. 
However, in true Gaullist fashion, successive French governments remained strong opponents 
of any delegation of sovereignty to the European level as this could impede an independent 
French foreign policy. Instead, they advocated a strictly intergovernmental approach to 
European cooperation in foreign affairs. Up until the end of the Cold War, France had 
considerable success in uploading its national preferences regarding the MEPP to the 
European level. The main reason for this was that France was able to claim a leadership 
position within the European Community. None of the other member states were able to 
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assume this role. The UK was often indecisive because it had to choose between 
commitments to the US and to Europe. Germany on the other hand failed to assume a leading 
role because of its historic constraints. Notable examples of France’s success are the French 
insistence to include the PLO as a party in the negotiations and the Palestinians right of self-
determination.43 However, in instances that developing a common European position failed, 
France did not hesitate to ‘renationalize’ foreign policy and use other channels such as the 
UNSC, its well-developed diplomatic network and the personal relations with Arab leaders of 
the French President.44 
 
  
Foreign policy mechanics 
The mechanics of foreign policy-making in France are very different from those in Germany 
and the UK. Unlike his German colleague, the French President enjoys tremendous influence 
in the domain of foreign and defence policy. The strong position of the French President has 
its origins in the creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958. The Fourth Republic, which was 
based on the dominance of political parties, had suffered from political instability since its 
inception after the Second World War. Successive governments rose and fell in quick 
succession. As Prime Ministers often lacked a majority in the Assemblée Nationale, they were 
unable to press for unpopular but much needed reforms. In order to prevent this from 
happening again, De Gaulle and his supporters advocated a new political system which put 
much more emphasis on strong presidents. Only such a system would have enough authority 
to pursue a policy of grandeur.45 De Gaulle’s  appointment on 1 June 1958 as President of the 
Fifth Republic led to the development of a new constitution in which the powers of the 
President were greatly expanded at the expense of the Assemblée Nationale. Under the 1958 
constitution, the responsibilities in the domains of foreign affairs and  defence reside with the 
President of the Republic. He is the head of state and the guarantor of national independence, 
of respect for the treaties and of territorial integrity of France. Furthermore, he is the 
commander of the French military and is the only person responsible for the launch of nuclear 
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missiles.46 In addition to this, the President can dispatch regular French troops abroad without 
the consent of the Assemblée Nationale.47  
 In short, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic has given the French President 
extensive powers in the area of foreign affairs and defence policy. These are so extensive that 
these policy areas are now considered to be an almost exclusive policy area for the French 
President, or domaine réservé.48 However, there are limited checks to balance the executive 
power in foreign affairs. International treaties have to be signed by the Prime Minister and 
they have to be ratified by the Assemblée Nationale and the Sénat. Furthermore, the 
Assemblée Nationale can assert influence on foreign and defence policy as it has to approve 
the budget.49  
 The pre-eminence of the French President in foreign affairs has led to a highly 
personalized French foreign policy. While this had the possibility to lead to significant 
changes in French foreign policy every time a new President was elected, policy lines have 
remained quite consistent.  The main reason for this was that the pursuit of grandeur and the 
politique arabe continued to play a central role in French foreign policy.  
The pre-eminence of the French President had several important implications for the 
functioning of French foreign policy. First of all, because of the extensive powers of the 
French President, France was able to respond fast to international developments as the 
president can take initiative without approval of the French parliament. In addition to this, he 
does not need to take sensitivities of coalition partners into account.  Furthermore, because of 
their pre-eminence and activity in foreign policy, French Presidents could to develop personal 
relationships with leaders from other states. On the other hand, the pre-eminence of the 
French President ensures that French diplomats are given relatively little freedom to act as 
representatives of France. In addition to this, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is overshadowed 
by the President.50  
 
 
 
                                                           
46
 Pia Christina Wood, ‘France’ in: David S. Sorenson and Pia Christina Wood (eds.) The Politics of 
Peacekeeping in the Post-cold War Era (Abingdon 2005) 73. 
47
 Ian Taylor, The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa (New York 2010). 
48
 Stephanie C. Hofmann, European Security in NATO's Shadow: Party Ideologies and Institution Building 
 (Cambridge 2013) 43. 
49
 Hofmann, European Security in NATO's Shadow, 44. 
50
 Mireia Delgado, ‘France and the Union for the Mediterranean: Individualism versus Co-operation’, 
Mediterranean Politics 16:1 (2011) 42. 
19 
 
Laïcité and the integration of immigrants 
French foreign policy towards the MEPP has an influential domestic dimension. The presence 
of large Muslim and Jewish populations has transformed France into a proxy of the Israeli-
Palestine conflict. Tensions between Israel and Palestine are imported into France, putting 
considerable strain on French society. An example of this were the violent protests which 
erupted in Paris after hostilities between Israel and Palestine flared up in June 2014.51 These 
violent clashes between two religious groups are in direct opposition to the French concept of 
secularism, or laïcité. Laïcité is one of the cornerstones of the Fifth Republic and its origins 
date back to the French Revolution of 1789. That year, the French National Constituent 
Assembly passed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. This declaration 
proclaimed that “no one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious 
views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law”.52 
From that moment, all authority was located in the state. However, the Catholic Church had 
retained significant power and continued to exert influence on the French state. In order to 
weaken the power of the Catholic Church in France, Church and state were officially 
separated with the Separation of Churches and State Act of 1905, firmly establishing laïcité.53 
Additionally, it proclaimed the state’s neutral position towards any religion and the state’s 
guarantee to defend the individual’s freedom of religion.  
This social contract between the state and the individual is one of the central aspects of 
French identity. An identity in which the Republic itself “is understood as one and indivisible, 
as, in the same way, the French people is conceived as being one, without regard to origin”.54 
This ideology prescribed specific requirements for the integration of immigrants into French 
society. These can be laid out in four interconnected policy principles.55 First, the integration 
of immigrants must be in line with laïcité. The French state respects the religious rights of the 
immigrants but does not give them special support, thus maintaining neutrality. Second, not 
an ethnic or religious group but the individual is integrated in French society. This also entails 
that during and after integration, there can be no form of communitarianism. Third, 
immigrants must respect the French law and culture. In return, the French law will protect 
their culture and traditions. Last, immigrants and Frenchmen alike are treated on a strictly 
equal basis, the possibility of positive discrimination is unthinkable. In short, the Fifth 
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Republic requires immigrants to assimilate into French society. Citizens of the Fifth Republic 
are identical in their Frenchness. The Republic, therefore, does not allow religious and ethnic 
groups to enjoy special rights because of their minority status but because they are French. By 
doing this, France strongly rejects multiculturalism. The concept of multiculturalism, closely 
connected to the  Anglo-Saxon world, was seen as a direct threat to the stability of the French 
state.56 
Laïcité requires the French state to maintain a neutral attitude in religious affairs. 
Therefore, the French state refused to involve itself in religious matters except for ensuring 
freedom of religion. This led to a laissez faire approach towards Muslim minorities in France. 
France tolerated international Muslim organizations and friendly secular Arab states on its 
territory to administer the religious practices of Muslim minorities in France. 57  This 
dependence on foreign governments and organizations limited integration as it promoted 
foreign influence over Muslim populations in France. 58  This became more and more a 
problem as many Muslim immigrants congregated in French suburbs. The poor living 
conditions in the banlieues and the lack of work created ideal conditions for radicalization of 
young Muslims. While this increased concerns over intra-communal strive between Muslims 
and Jews and over social unrest in general, it is overall of marginal influence on French policy 
towards the Peace Process. The main reason for this is that France’s politique arabe is still the 
main guide for French foreign policy. This has resulted in a foreign policy which is already 
critical of Israel and favourable to Palestinian statehood.59 Muslim influence through political 
channels is also quite weak. There is no large Muslim political party which represents the 
French Muslims. Additionally, out of France’s five million Muslims, only a quarter 
participate in the political process. Either because they are not eligible to vote or out of 
disinterest.60  
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Economic Variables 
France maintains extensive economic ties with the Middle East. In 2012, the total trade 
between France and the Middle East amounted to 57 billion euro.61 A considerable part of this 
trade consist of oil and arms. As the MENA region is France’s principle supplier of oil, 
France is quite vulnerable to supply disruption in the event of instability. For the past decade, 
French exports to Israel have been between 1 billion and 1.3 billion euros. Imports from Israel 
have hovered around 1 billion yearly.62  
 France sees weapon exports as a way to boost its ailing economy. The Middle East has 
been an especially important market for this. Between 2010 and 2014, 38% of French weapon 
exports went to the Middle East. 63  The demand for sophisticated weaponry has grown 
significantly since the spread of popular revolts in the MENA region in 2011. However, 
several states are reputed violators of human rights.  Important customers of French weaponry 
are Saudi Arabia and Egypt, states with a bad human rights record. Often, the prospect of a 
lucrative deal wins over human rights concerns. One example is France’s decision to sell 
Rafale jets to Egypt after the US suspended the sale of arms on the grounds of human right 
violations.64  
 Overall, France can be regarded as an important actor in the MEPP. In this process, 
France has become an key champion of the Palestinian cause. France’s favourable position 
towards the Palestinians stems not so much because of pressures from its large Muslim 
community but rather from the need to pursue an independent political course to attain 
grandeur. This position has been strengthened by France’s extensive economical ties  with the 
Arab world.  
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The United Kingdom 
 
Whereas France has tried to steer an independent course in foreign affairs, the UK has 
focused on aligning its foreign policy with that of the USA. This has had significant 
consequences for its policy towards the MEPP. This chapter starts with UK’s foreign policy 
tradition, thereby focusing on the tensions in British commitments. After that, the tensions 
within the British government will be discussed. It continues with the influence of immigrants 
on British foreign policy. Lastly, the economic interests and ties of the UK with the Middle 
East will be discussed.  
 
 
The United Kingdom  and its balancing act 
Like France, Great Britain has extensive historical ties with the Middle East. For much of the 
19th century and the first half of the 20th century, the British played a leading role in the 
Middle East. British interests in the region were both strategic and commercial of nature. For 
strategic reasons, the survival of the Ottoman Empire was essential for containing Russian 
expansionism. Moreover, the Suez Canal, which was opened in 1869, had become a crucial 
link between Great Britain and its colonies in the Far East. Furthermore, the Royal Navy’s 
switch from coal to oil on the eve of the First World War made the unimpeded flow of oil, 
which was abundant in the region, of vital importance to Great Britain.65 Finally, stability in 
the Middle East was deemed of great importance for the extensive commercial interests of 
Great Britain in region. 
 Following the end of the Second World War, Great Britain was unable to maintain its 
extensive presence in the Middle East. The Second World War had taken a heavy toll on the 
British economy. In addition to this, Britain was heavily indebted to the US, its colonies and 
protectorates.66 This posed severe problems to British commitments in the Middle East. First 
of all, the British were unable to maintain order in the British Mandate of Palestine. Harried 
by Zionist rebels and unable to stop clashes between Zionists and Arab nationalists, the 
British asked the UN to resolve the conflict.67 This led to the Partition Resolution of 1947 
which proposed a ‘two-state solution’. The Zionists accepted but the Arabs did not, resulting 
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in more violence. In the end, the British pulled out. Another concern was the rise of Arab 
nationalism in the region. In 1952, a group of Egyptian officers had staged a military coup in 
Egypt and thus ended Britain’s influence in Egypt.68 However, while Britain’s influence in the 
region was diminishing, strategic and commercial interests in the region continued to exist. 
The British sought to contain the influence of the Soviet Union, ensure freedom of navigation 
and commerce and secure unimpeded access to Gulf Oil. 
In order to pursue these interests, the British aligned their foreign policy closely to that 
of the US. After the Second World War, it had become clear that the US would become the 
new dominant power in the region. Close alignment with US foreign policy would enable the 
UK to maximize its influence by using the US as a power multiplier. Alignment was fairly 
easy as US and UK interest were quite congruent. Moreover, their close economic, cultural 
and political ties and intense cooperation during the two World Wars had led to the 
development of a ‘special relationship’.69 When Great Britain joined the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1973, it was not so much seen as a political project but more as a means 
to improve the British economy. In matters of security and foreign policy, the UK continued 
to rely strongly on its special relationship with the US. This was also evident in voting in the 
UNSC where the British, unlike France, did not feel the need to assert themselves. Instead, the 
British saw themselves more and more as a bridge in the transatlantic alliance.70  
According to Spyer, two strategies to secure British interests competed for dominance 
within the British government. The ‘strategic approach’, which has been more prevalent at 10 
Downing Street, saw the rise of aggressive anti-Western movements such as Pan-Arabic 
nationalism and radical Islamism as a threat to regional stability. It was therefore imperative 
that these forces were countered. Israel, a democratic and Western oriented state with a strong 
military apparatus was seen as a useful tool to promote British influence and keep the Soviets 
out.71 Moreover, supporting Israeli military superiority by selling arms to Israel would act as a 
deterrent to Arab aggression.72 The other strategy, the ‘diplomatic approach’, has been more 
prevalent in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The diplomatic approach views 
Israel as the main source of regional instability, complicating British relations with Arab 
nations. Criticizing and Distancing itself from Israel is regarded as a way to improve British 
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relations with the Arab world. 73  Broadly speaking, the strategic approach has been the 
dominant strategy in the 1950s and 1960s. An example of the strategic approach is the Suez 
Crisis during which Great Britain cooperated with Israel to remove the Egyptian president 
Abdel Nasser from power and secure the Suez Canal. The diplomatic approach gained the 
upper hand by the late 1960s when the Heath government came to power. This was most 
notable during the Yum Kippur War when the British government declared neutrality.74  
 
 
Foreign policy mechanics in Great Britain 
Traditionally, British foreign policy is formulated by 10 Downing Street in consultation with 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). However, there have been periods of ‘prime 
ministerial dominance’ such as the term of Tony Blair (1997-2007).75 During Blair’s term, 
there had been a tendency to centralize and streamline foreign policy-making. In order to do 
this, a semi-official ‘Department of the Prime Minister’ was created.76 Several key-decisions 
in British foreign policy such as the Kosovo Intervention in 1999 and the invasion of Iraq in 
2003 were made through private meetings with special advisors from the ‘Department of the 
Prime Minister’ instead of the traditional way of including the Cabinet and consulting the 
FCO. Blair used his ministerial powers to advance his own vision on the MEPP and curb the 
pro-Arab visions in the FCO. One example of this was the removal of Ben Bradshaw from the 
office of the under-secretary for Middle East Affairs. Bradshaw was known for his critical 
stance towards Israel.77 
In matters of foreign policy, there is little or no democratic oversight. Under the ‘royal 
prerogative’, a remnant from feudal times, far-reaching executive powers in the domain of 
foreign affairs and security policy are vested in the British monarch. The exercise of these 
powers are in the hands of the Prime Minister and other Ministers. The result is that the 
British government is not required to seek the approval from the British Parliament for any 
foreign policy decisions. Actions such as declaring war, signing treaties or any other form of 
conducting diplomacy are thus put outside democratic control.78 This gives a dominant Prime 
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Minister almost as much power as a president. Critics have stated that Blair had extended his 
powers that he was accused of ‘presidentialism’.79 
The 2010 parliamentary elections necessitated the creation of a coalition government 
of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, the highly centralized decision-making structure 
of the previous years was watered down. The main reason for this was that the two political 
parties had to work together. This situation necessitated collective discussion and decision 
making between both parties.80 This was reaffirmed in the 2010 Coalition Agreement for 
Stability and Reform which called for “an appropriate degree of consultation and discussion 
among Ministers to provide the opportunity for them to express their views frankly as 
decisions are reached.”81 
 
 
The legacy of the British Empire and its impact on voting behaviour 
The legacy of the British Empire has left a significant mark on British society. In the British 
Empire, all people living in the empire were deemed subject to the British Crown. As British 
subjects had full rights of citizenship, they had the right of abode. After the Second World, 
there was considerable migration from the British Empire, Dominions and its former colonies 
as Great Britain was faced with labor shortages. The majority of these immigrants came from 
the former colony of British India. However, immigration of ‘colored people’ from the 
Empire, Dominions and former colonies continued throughout the 1950s. This resulted in 
growing tensions within British society and popular opposition against immigration grew. By 
the time the British government took the first steps to limit immigration from the 
Commonwealth  in 1962, approximately 500.000 Commonwealth immigrants had arrived in 
the UK. They were later followed by their spouses and dependents, significantly adding up to 
their numbers.82 
 The liberal British immigration and citizenship policies had attracted large numbers of 
immigrants of which a considerable amount was Muslim. These numbers increased through 
birth and by the arrival of Somali refugees in the 1990s and 2000s. By 2011, the number of 
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Muslims living in the UK had increased to 2.7 million.83 Most of them had British citizenship 
and were born in Britain.84 As British citizens, they could participate in the political process. 
The sizeable British Muslim community began to organize itself politically with the creation 
of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in 1997. The MCB, an umbrella organization of 
around 250 British Muslim institutions, quickly became the main organization to represent 
Muslims politically in the UK.85 The MCB did not only focus on domestic issues but also had 
a foreign policy agenda which focused on Muslim issues such as the situation in Palestine and 
Iraq. Consequently, the MCB encouraged Muslims to vote on Muslim issues.86  However, 
Rynhold and Spyer argue that Muslims failed to influence British policy towards the Peace 
Process. The main reason for this is that British elections are based on the single-winner 
system. In this system, the winner of a district-election receives all the votes. It is therefore 
difficult for minorities to exert political influence. The only situation in which minorities 
could exert influence was in a situation in which no party is sure that it has enough popular 
support to secure the votes.87 The influence of the Jewish community living in the UK was 
even more marginal as it was far smaller. Moreover, the Jewish community voted primarily 
on domestic issues.88  
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Economic factors 
British foreign policy towards the MEPP has always been significantly influenced by 
economic considerations. The British economy has been very dependent on trade. It therefore 
had a lot to gain from a stable business climate in the Middle East. The vulnerability of the 
British economy to repercussions of incidents in the Middle East became apparent after the 
Six-Day War. In retaliation for British support to Israel during the war, the Egyptians closed 
the Suez Canal for Western shipping, raising transport costs by 20 million pounds per 
month.89 Moreover, the Arabs imposed an oil embargo on Great Britain and withdrew their 
money from British banks. The economic shock resulted in a severe deficit in Britain’s 
balance of payments, compelling the government to devaluate the pound. The adverse 
economic consequences of Great Britain’s support to Israel forced Great Britain to adopt a 
position towards the conflict which was more accommodating towards the Arab world.90 
According to Rynhold and Spyer, this caused an increased emphasis on trade relations with 
the Arab states at the expense of high politics from the 1970s onward.91  
The threat of an oil embargo has lost considerable power due to the development of 
Britain’s own oil sources in the 1970s. However, stability in the region is still important as 
unrest could negatively influence world oil prices, thereby affecting the British economy. 
Additionally, a stable environment is essential for the British petrol companies active in the 
region.92 Furthermore, ensuring stability in the region would help promote trade. Trade with 
the region had been very lucrative, especially the trade in military equipment. The sale of 
arms to the region has been of substantial economic importance as it provided employment 
and helped to improve Britain’s trade balance with the region. The 1985 al-Yamana arms deal 
alone totaled more than 40 billion pounds.93 Such sales had considerable influence on British 
policy towards the MEPP. One example being an arms deal with Saudi Arabia in exchange 
for British efforts for pressing for a more pro-Palestinian stance in the 1980 Venice 
Declaration.94 Even today, the Middle East remains a key market for British arms exports. In 
2013, it represented more than two-thirds of new British arms export contracts.95  
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The sale of arms to the region provides a contrasting image of British policy in the 
region. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the UK imposed an arms embargo on Israel 
which would last until 1994 when progress in the Peace Process was made. 96 Albeit the 
British government did not impose a new arms embargo on Israel, it continued to put arms 
sales under close scrutiny. Between 2000 and 2008, of the 237 arms export licenses, 24 were 
revoked. Moreover, in July 2009, five weapon contracts were canceled due to 
disproportionate violence during the 2008-2009 Gaza War.97 This stands in stark contrast with 
British arms sales to the rest of the region which usually continue despite human rights 
violations. A reason for this could be that arms sales to the rest of the region are significantly 
higher than to Israel. As the US is responsible for almost 95% of Israeli military equipment 
imports, there is only marginal room for British arms sales.98  
Thus, like France, the UK has significant economical interests with the Arab world. 
However in contrast to the French, this has not led to a position which decidedly favors the 
Palestinian side. The large Muslim minority in the UK also seem to have relatively little 
influence on the British position towards the Peace Process. Instead, this position is 
influenced by the prevailing approach in the British government as well as its special relation 
with the US.    
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Germany 
 
Compared to France and Great Britain, Germany is a very different international actor. Even 
though France and Britain are faced with a relative decline of power, they still remain major 
powers. They have a large military apparatus with nuclear capability and maintain a 
permanent seat in the UNSC. Both have had a long imperial tradition which resulted in 
historical ties with many countries and an active foreign policy. Additionally, they have a 
strongly developed strategic culture in which the use of military force is acceptable when 
necessary. Germany on the other hand could not be more different. It neither has nuclear arms 
nor a permanent seat in the UNSC. While it does have a sizeable army, it is meant solely for 
defence purposes. While it is one of the largest economies in the world, it is hesitant to take a 
leading role in Europe or on the international stage. Moreover, it is antagonistic to the use of 
military force. The main cause of this attitude is Germany’s dark World War Two past. What 
the latter meant for Germany’s foreign policy tradition, foreign policy mechanics and 
integration policy will be discussed below.  
 
Civilian power Germany 
Right after the Second World War, the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) foreign policy 
was dominated by two issues: rehabilitation and security. The end of the Second World War 
had left Germany ruined and divided. Fearing a resurgence of German militarism, the allies 
did not allow the FRG to have military forces. However, the start of the Cold War drastically 
changed this. West Germany was in the center of Europe and shared a long border with the 
Warsaw Bloc. Due to this, not only West Germany but the whole of Western Europe was 
dangerously exposed to a Soviet attack. The Soviet threat became even more apparent with 
the Berlin Blockade (1948-1949) and the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953). The 
FRG’s first Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Konrad Adenauer, therefore sought a 
way to increase West German security. This was done through promoting a close alliance 
with the US and the militarization of West Germany. As direct militarization was highly 
controversial within both the West and East, Adenauer sought to integrate Germany in 
Western multilateral organizations to take away western concerns. This policy of 
Westbindung did not only lead to increased security, it also expedited the rehabilitation of 
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West Germany. 99  Examples of this are the European Coal and Steel Community and 
Germany’s remilitarization under NATO command.  
The defeat of the Third Reich had a profound influence on the FRG and its foreign 
policy. The war had left a strong pacifistic sentiment in West-German society. In addition to 
this, the Western Allies wanted to make sure that aggressive ambitions would not resurface in 
West Germany. This resulted in a very pacifistic constitution. This constitution, the 
Grundgesetz (Basic Law), restricted the use of force to the defense of German territory and 
mutual collective security.100 Moreover, the Grundgesetz commits Germany to the promotion 
of human rights, democracy and the active participation in multilateral organizations.101 The 
nature of the Grundgesetz and the strong pacifistic character of German society has led to 
Germany being coined a ‘civilian power’. Maull, a prominent author on civilian power, 
describes a civilian power as “a particular foreign-policy identity which promoted 
multilateralism, institution-building and supranational integration”.102 In addition to this, a 
civilian power puts strong stress on the use of diplomacy over force. This culture of national 
restraint facilitated Germany’s international rehabilitation. However, it also prevented 
Germany to act independently in foreign affairs. Instead, it deferred leadership to the US or 
occasionally to the EEC. This resulted in low political engagement towards the Middle East.  
However, one issue in which Germany played an active role was the security of Israel. 
After the Second World War, Adenauer wanted to restore German legitimacy by showing 
West Germany’s willingness to atone for the crimes committed by the Nazi regime. Adenauer, 
and many Germans with him, felt that West Germany had a moral obligation to the young 
Jewish state to pay reparations and help provide security.103 This would not only restore West 
Germany’s legitimacy but also improve Germany’s relationship with the US. The first step in 
the development of a ‘special relationship’ between Germany and Israel was set with the 1952 
Luxembourg Restitution Agreement between the FRG and Israel.104 This Agreement marked 
the start of extensive financial reparations to Israel which continued over the following 
decades. These reparations were later expanded to include secret arms shipments to Israel. 
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These were kept secret as there was much domestic and international opposition to such 
practices. When German newspapers exposed these deliveries in 1964, severe crises ensued 
within Germany and between Germany and the Arab world.105  
The diplomatic crisis between the FRG and the Arab world culminated during the 
Yom Kippur War of 1973 when Arabian oil producing states imposed an oil embargo on the 
FRG. The ensuing Energy Crisis led Chancellor Willy Brandt to adopt a different policy 
towards the Middle East. Under the new policy of ‘even-handedness’, Germany sought to 
maintain its special relationship with Israel while improving its relations with the Arab 
world.106 However, this balanced policy was at times very problematic as it could be very 
difficult to satisfy commitments to Israel without violating those to Arab states and vice 
versa.107 The special relationship between Germany and Israel exists until this day. With the 
full restoration of Germany’s sovereignty in 1991, extensive German commitments to Israel 
were no longer needed to rehabilitate Germany. Instead, the special relationship hinged solely 
on a moral responsibility to protect the Israeli state.108 This was underlined in Chancellor 
Merkel’s speech to the Knesset in 2008. In this speech, Merkel stated that the security of 
Israel remained a “historischen Verantwortung Deutschlands” and part of German 
“Staatsräson”.109  
The early 1990s marked a radical change in Germany’s international position. With 
Germany’s reunification in 1990, Germany became the third biggest economy in the world 
and the most populous member of the EEC. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991 brought an end to the East-West conflict. This resulted in a fundamental change in 
Germany’s geopolitical position and security. The German reunification raised fears over a 
resurgence of German nationalism and an aggressive foreign policy. To dispel these fears, the 
German government refrained from unilateralist moves. Instead, it continued to focus on 
cooperation through multilateral and supra-national frameworks such as the EU. Additionally, 
Germany continued to defer leadership in foreign affairs to the US.110  
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This began to change by the end of the 1990s. The abolishment of border controls by 
the Schengen Treaty of 1990 had extended Germany’s border to the Mediterranean. Therefore, 
Mediterranean security issues such as terrorism, illegal immigration and organized crime now 
became German security issues as well.111 In addition to this, several EU actors had growing 
aspirations for the EU in the region. The European Parliament, the European Commission and 
individual member states such as France were pushing for more active European involvement 
in the MEPP. The inception of the CFSP and the creation of the post of HR had created the 
perfect platform for this. While German policymakers became concerned that this would lead 
to a European policy which would deviate too much from the German position, it also created 
opportunities. Through the CFSP, Germany could free itself from its traditional constraints. 
The CFSP could be used as a cover for German policies. By uploading its national 
preferences to the European level, Germany could follow policies which would otherwise face 
domestic or international criticism.112 
 
Foreign policy mechanics of Germany 
In early 1948, the Western occupying powers instructed the Minister Presidents of the Länder, 
the federal states within Germany, to draft a constitution for the FRG. The Grundgesetz was 
initially meant to be a provisional constitution but remains up to today fundamental to 
Germany. 113  The Grundgesetz was deeply influenced by the experiences of the Weimar 
Republic and the Second World War. First of all, the Länder wanted to avoid the flaws of the 
Weimar Republic. The last Reichspräsident of the Republic, Paul von Hindenburg, had used 
his extensive presidential powers to undermine the democracy and establish an authoritarian 
regime.114 The rise to power of Hitler in the 1930s saw the dismantlement of the Weimar 
Constitution and the subsequent end of democracy. In order to prevent this from happening 
again, the Grundgesetz provides the Länder with considerable sovereignty. This federalization 
would act as a horizontal division of power.115 However, while this causes a considerable 
dispersion of power in the area of foreign policy, the Federal Government holds the exclusive 
competence. 
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Within the Federal Government, the Federal Chancellor on the other hand holds 
significant power. The Grundgesetz provides the Chancellor with so-called 
Richtlinienkompetenz (guiding competence). This enables the Chancellor to set strategic 
guidelines for the federal government.116 As a result, the foreign policy competences of the 
Federal Chancellor bear quite some similarities with those of the French President. It could 
even be argued that the Federal Chancellor enjoys a ‘domaine réservé’ just like his French 
counterpart.  
While the Federal Chancellor enjoys quite some freedom in the area of foreign affairs, 
it should be noted that the Bundesdag is endowed with several competences which limit the  
power of the Chancellor. First of all, the Bundesdag has to approve the budget. Secondly, the 
Bundestag can subject the government to public scrutiny though plenary debates and 
parliamentary committees. Third, the Bundestag has to approve the foreign deployment of 
German military. Finally, the Bundestag has to give its consent to international treaties signed 
by the German government. 117  Although the Federal President is the head of state, his 
function is mainly symbolical and will therefore not be further discussed here.  
 
 Jus sanguinis and German integration 
In contrast to France and the UK, German nationality law was based on jus sanguinis. Jus 
sanguinis, or right of blood, implies that people remain citizens of the same state as which 
their parents belong, regardless of the place they were born or lived. Jus sanguinis was first 
introduced in Bavaria in 1818 and gained in popularity in the subsequent years and became 
the cornerstone of the German Nationality Law in 1913.118 The Third Reich manipulated the 
German Nationality Law to promote racial hierarchy and to justify the mass murder of Jews 
and other minorities.119 After World War II, the pre-Nazi application of  jus sanguinis was 
maintained in the FRG for two reasons. First of all, the Second World War had left many 
ethnic Germans scattered over Eastern Europe. There, they faced humiliation, ethnic 
cleansing and denaturalization. Providing these Germans a safe haven in the FRG was seen as 
a human right. Furthermore, jus sanguinis was used to put pressure on the German 
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Democratic Republic (GDR); East German citizens who were expelled or managed to escape 
from the GDR were granted West German citizenship.120  
 
 This policy attracted huge numbers of Germans in the years after WWII. Bonn initially 
feared that the enormous influx of people would lead to severe unemployment. However, the 
rapid economic revival of West Germany drastically reduced unemployment. Instead, severe 
labor shortages threatened economic growth. To mitigate these shortages, the German 
government signed labor agreements with Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Portugal, and 
Yugoslavia.121 This provided temporary work and resident permits to citizens of these states. 
In the subsequent years, many Gastarbeiter came to work in Germany. While many European 
guest workers returned to their country, a significant, mostly Turkish population remained.  
These people were not integrated in German society. Instead, a remarkable system 
developed. The policy of jus sanguinis made it almost impossible for immigrants to attain 
German citizenship and therefore participate in the political process. However, at the same 
time immigrants were granted all the benefits of the German welfare system. Timo Behr coins 
this situation as one of ‘civic exclusion’.122 Instead of forcing immigrants to assimilate as was 
being done in France, the FRG applied a laissez-faire approach towards its immigrants. As the 
West German government was under the assumption that these immigrants would stay 
temporarily in Germany, no effort was made to integrate these immigrants into West German 
society. This led to a situation in which many first and second generation immigrants did not 
speak German and maintained their customs and habits. As they were allowed to retain their 
culture and were excluded from German citizenship, many immigrants primarily identified 
themselves with Islam or their homeland instead of Germany.123 As a considerable portion of 
Germany’s sizeable Muslim population was excluded from the political process, there was 
little domestic pressure to change German policy towards the MEPP.   
However, by the mid 1990s, the German government started to realize that many 
Turkish immigrants had settled permanently in Germany. Germany had become an 
Immigrationsland, or immigration country, in which many of its immigrants were living in a 
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parallel society within Germany. The existence of such a Parallelgesellschaft was viewed 
with increasing discomfort. There were fears that the exclusionist policies in Germany had 
facilitated Islamic fundamentalism in Germany. In order to remediate this, several reforms 
were undertaken. With the introduction of the Citizen Act in 1999,  the jus solis principle was 
introduced, thereby granting citizenship to children born in Germany after 1 January 2000. 
Additionally, it was made possible to become a German citizen after residing in Germany for 
eight years and passing a language test.124 Nonetheless, naturalization rates still remain very 
low. Of the four million Muslims, which represent about 5% of the German population (2010), 
only 45% have obtained German citizenship.125 One of the reasons for this is the fact that the 
Citizen Act does not allow dual citizenship. In order to become naturalized, immigrants have 
to give up their former citizenship. However, as many immigrants feel themselves 
marginalized in German society but are entitled to all the benefits of the German welfare state, 
the incentive to become naturalized remains low.  
 
Economic factors 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Germany had been very dependent on Arab oil. On the eve of 
the 1973 Energy Crisis, Arab oil accounted for up to 80 percent of German oil supplies.126 
Since then, Germany has diversified its energy supply. Currently, Russia is Germany’s main 
supplier of carbohydrates. Other suppliers are Norway and the UK.127 While Arab oil still 
makes up a sizeable portion of the German energy supply, an Arabian oil boycott would not 
have such far-reaching consequences as in 1973. Nonetheless, Germany benefits just like 
France and the UK from stability in the Middle East since it facilitates stable oil prices.  
 In 2014, German exports to the Arab world were 37 billion Euro while German 
imports from Arab countries totalled 11 billion Euro. 128  This has resulted in Germany 
becoming an important trade partner for the region. These extensive trade ties outweigh 
Arabian reservations towards Germany on the grounds of it being too pro-Israel. 129  
Germany’s trade ties with Israel are also sizeable as the total trade amounted to over 6 billion 
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dollar in 2013. This has made Israel one of Germany’s biggest trade partners in the Middle 
East.130  
 Of the Big Three, Germany is the closest supporter of the Israeli cause. Maintaining its 
special relation with Israel is seen by the Germans as a way to redeem themselves. However, 
some of Germany’s historical constraints are slowly eroding due to the increase in 
competences of the CFSP.  This enables Germany to use the EU as a cover for a more 
assertive foreign policy. Nevertheless, strong emphasis on US leadership is maintained. It 
should be noted that just like in France and the UK, the influence of Germany’s Muslim 
minority on its foreign policy is relatively small. Moreover, economic considerations seem to 
play a minor role. Despite its pro-Israel position, the Arab world has continued to maintain 
extensive economic ties with Germany. 
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Evolution of the EU position towards the Middle East Peace Process 
 
For a considerable time, the Venice Declaration of June 12-13, 1980 issued by the European 
Council provided the basis for the Europe’s policy towards the MEPP. The Venice 
Declaration was quite revolutionary as it demanded that “the Palestinian people [was to] be 
allowed to exercise fully its rights to self-determination”131. Additionally, the EC criticized 
Israel for its settlement policy in Palestine territory, stating that it was “deeply convinced that 
the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East.”132 
Furthermore, the EC stressed that it would “not accept any unilateral initiative designed to 
change the status of Jerusalem.” 133  Finally, it called for the inclusion of the Palestine 
Liberalization organization (PLO) in negotiations.  
While European declarations underlined the necessity for “a homeland for the 
Palestinian people” and the legitimate right of the Palestinian people “to express a national 
identity”, these statements did not include an explicit call for the creation of a Palestinian state. 
The first statement which mentioned Palestinian statehood as the preferred outcome of the 
MEPP was a statement issued at the Cardiff European Council meeting in 1998. In it, the 
Council had called upon Israel “to recognize the right of the Palestinians to exercise self-
determination, without excluding the option of a State”. A year later, at the European Council 
meeting in Berlin, the European Union reaffirmed its previous position on the Middle East. In 
addition to this, it stated for the first time that it was in favor of “the creation of a democratic, 
viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State”. 134  The last major change in the EU’s 
position came during the EU Council summit of December 2009, when the EU recognized 
Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state.135  
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The CFSP before Lisbon, convergence of the Big Three? 
 
On 1 November 1993, the Maastricht Treaty came into force, thereby establishing the EU. 
The Maastricht Treaty included a new framework for European cooperation in foreign policy: 
the CFSP. In the first part of this chapter, the mechanics and evolution of the CFSP up to the 
Lisbon Treaty will be discussed. In the second part, the actions of the Big Three regarding 
four key issues in the MEPP will be discussed. These are: the EU-Israel Association 
Agreement, the appointment of the EU Special Envoy to the Middle East, the 2006 
Palestinian legislative elections, and the Gaza War of 2008-2009. By focusing on the 
positions and actions of France, the UK and Germany, I will determine whether 
Europeanization has occurred.  
 
From the EPC to a Common Foreign Security Policy 
In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty established the EU. One of the main innovations which the 
Maastricht Treaty brought about was the creation of the CFSP. It replaced the European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism, an informal forum for member states of the 
European Community to coordinate their positions on foreign affairs issues by consultation. 
The EPC had been strictly intergovernmental; positions were only formulated when all 
member states agreed to it. Additionally, while individual countries were expected to “take 
full account of the policies and interests of their European partners”, there were no 
mechanisms to make member states adhere to common positions. Finally, none of the key 
documents regarding the functioning of the EPC, the Luxembourg, Copenhagen and London 
reports, had treaty status. Not only did this allow member states to renegotiate agreements, it 
also gave them the opportunity to change or abandon the EPC at will.136   
 The CFSP tried to augment the effectiveness of foreign policy making in the EU. The 
ineffectiveness of the EPC had been painfully clear during the Yugoslav Wars. While the war 
raged, the EU proved unable to come up with a unified position. The CFSP was intended to 
create a more coherent European foreign policy. However, the CFSP remained strictly 
intergovernmental as decisions in the Foreign Affairs Council were taken by unanimity. 
While this practice remained largely in place for the next 15 years, several major innovations 
within the CFSP have been brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty 
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of Nice (1999). The first innovation was the creation of the post of High Representative for 
the Common Foreign Security Policy. This enhanced the EU’s international profile as it 
provided the EU with a ‘face’ for the outside world. The official mandate of the HR was to 
contribute “to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when 
appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through 
conducting political dialogue with third parties.”137  
The other innovation was the introduction of ‘constructive abstention’. 138  While 
unanimity in the decision-making process was maintained, member states could now abstain 
from voting. An abstention would not be seen as a veto. This enabled the EU to adopt 
decisions without the affirmative vote of all its members. In the event that a member state 
abstains, it is not obliged to adhere to the EU decision. However, the member state is expected 
to refrain from taking decisions which might interfere with the decision. During my research, 
I have not found a single case of a member state ignoring a decision regarding the MEPP.   
Finally, the Treaty of Nice (1999) enabled the practice of ‘enhanced cooperation’ 
within the CFSP framework. Enhanced cooperation allowed cooperation between a minimum 
of member states on issues without other member states involved. However, enhanced 
cooperation must be undertaken within the EU framework of the CFSP. Additionally, any 
enhanced cooperation must be submitted to the European Commission who will ascertain if 
the proposed cooperation is consistent with other EU policies. Moreover, it has to be 
submitted to the Council which has to vote on it by unanimity.139  These measures have 
created such high thresholds that enhanced cooperation on such a sensitive and contentious 
issue such as the MEPP is unthinkable.  
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The EU-Israel Association Agreement  
Germany is a staunch proponent of what Patrick Müller has dubbed ‘economic 
peacemaking’.140 Germany argues that the EU should support the peace process in the Middle 
East through promoting economic growth. During the German Presidency of the EU in the 
second half of 1994, Germany campaigned for the development of closer economic ties 
between the EU and Israel. It thereby received close support from Great Britain.141 At the 
1994 Essen European Council meeting, it was agreed that Israel should enjoy a “special status 
in its relations with the EU”. 142  Consequently, the EU and Israel signed the EU-Israel 
Association Agreement (AA) in November 1995. However it took four more years before the 
AA was ratified by all relevant actors. The Bundestag quickly ratified the AA. However, 
despite efforts by President Chirac, the Assemblée Nationale used one of its few instruments 
to influence French foreign policy and refused to ratify the AA. The Assemblée Nationale 
mentioned the lack of progress in the Peace Process as the reason for its refusal.143 Only after 
the signing of the Hebron Agreement between Israel and the PLO did the Assemblée 
Nationale ratify the AA.  
While the ratification of the AA agreement is an important sign of convergence, it is 
difficult to assign this to Europeanization. The main reason for this is the fact that it was in the 
interest of the Big Three to establish closer economic cooperation with Israel as it was a 
strong and developed economy. Closer cooperation could have a positive impact on the 
economies of the Big Three. However, the fact that the Big Three were willing to harm their 
relations with the Arab world over the AA agreement, thereby possibly harming their 
economic interests, seems to suggest that economic ties didn’t trump political ones. Thus, the 
AA agreement is a sign of Europeanization in the first place.  
 
The Special Envoy to the Middle East Peace Process 
Even though France did not always manage to successfully upload its position to the EU, its 
considerable efforts to stake out a more prominent role for France (and thus the EU) did force 
the other member states to focus on the region.144 One example of this is President Chirac’s 
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speech at the Cairo University on 8 April 1996 which gained much attention worldwide. 
Among other things, Chirac spoke of France’s dedication to the rights of peoples to self-
determination, thereby indirectly referring to the Palestinians. Moreover, he stated that he did 
not speak for France but for the EU as a whole.145 By doing so, Chirac forced the EU to take 
action. In a response, the European Council decided to appoint a special envoy to the Peace 
Process. After vigorous lobbying by France, Miguel Moratinos, the Spanish ambassador to 
Israel, was appointed as envoy. The choice for Moratinos represented a major diplomatic 
victory of France over more pro-Israeli member states such as Germany and the UK. The 
reason for this was that the position of Spain towards the Peace Process was quite close to the 
stance of France. Spain had always tried to follow a balanced policy towards the MEPP, 
favoring both the Israeli right for security and the Palestinian right for self-determination.146 
However, Germany and the UK made sure that the mandate of the EU envoy would not 
interfere with US diplomacy in the Middle East. 147  This reduced the envoy’s room for 
maneuver considerably. The novelty of the position as well as the fact that the special envoy 
was of a member state whose position was close to that of France resembled an important 
diplomatic victory for France. This event is a clear instance of successful Europeanization 
through the uploading of national positions. 
 
The 2006 elections 
On 26 January 2006, the first Palestinian legislative elections in ten years were held. The next 
day, the EU Election Observation Mission reported that the elections had been “open and 
fairly-contested”.148 The elections had led to a stunning victory by the Change and Reform 
Party, the political branch of Hamas. This victory created a big dilemma for the EU. Just two 
years prior to the elections, Hamas had been put on the European terror blacklist as it had 
refused to renounce violence and recognize Israel. The EU now had to choose between 
dealing with a democratically elected government or sever all contacts.  
In reaction to the victory of Hamas, the US cut off aid to the Palestine Authority while 
continuing to provide funds for humanitarian projects through nongovernmental 
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organizations.149 The British did the same before the EU could come up with a common 
position.150 During EU deliberations on the Hamas victory, the UK, who was supported by 
Germany on this issue, successfully managed to upload its  position the European level. This 
resulted in a boycott of the Hamas government and a suspension of EU aid to the Hamas 
controlled Gaza Strip until Hamas adhered to the Quartet’s principles.151 Regardless of the 
boycott, France and Sweden continued to have informal contacts with Hamas officials.152 
However, France closed ranks with the UK and Germany when Sweden issued Schengen 
visas to Hamas officials. This lead to heavy criticism from the Big Three.153 It is not entirely 
clear why France adopted this position. However, one reason for this could be that continued 
defiance of the more punitive stance of most EU members would have isolated France too 
much. This could therefore be seen as an instance of more forceful influences of 
Europeanization.  
 
The 2008-2009 Gaza War  
On 4 November 2008, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) launched an operation in Gaza with the 
goal of destroying an illegal supply tunnel. During this operation, six Hamas members were 
killed. Hamas retaliated by launching Kassam rockets at Israel, ending the truce which had 
existed since 19 June 2008.154 This led to an escalation of violence culminating in Operation 
Cast Lead. Operation Cast Lead started on 27 December 2008 with Israeli airstrikes on Gaza. 
The European presidency, which was held by France at that time, condemned both the rocket 
strikes and air raids. In addition to this, the Presidency called for an immediate end of the 
violence and condemned the disproportionate use of force.155 The British had taken a similar 
position to this whereas Germany emphasized Israel’s right to defend itself. Moreover, it 
stated that Hamas was to blame for the escalation of violence.156 Still, the statement after the 
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Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 30 December showed considerable convergence as it 
called for an “immediate and permanent ceasefire.”157 
 However, on 1 January 2009, the Czech Republic took over the EU Presidency. The 
Czech Republic is one of Israel’s staunchest supporters and therefore took a much lighter 
stance on the conflict. When Israel commenced a ground offensive in Gaza, the presidency 
stated that the action was “defensive, not offensive”.158 This statement was much criticized by 
many member states. France and the UK responded quickly by stating that the statement did 
not bind them and that it damaged reconciliation attempts.159 The Czechs apologized, stating 
that the only official standpoint of the Czech Republic is the position which was agreed on 
during the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 30 December, calling for “the establishment of 
a ceasefire”. 160  Yet unlike the statement of the Foreign Affair Council, the new Czech 
Presidency only called for the “establishment of a ceasefire”, not one that was “immediate and 
permanent.” This statement was much more favourable to Israel than the one during the 
French Presidency. Only after UN Security Council Resolution 1860 was adopted did  the EU 
presidency clearly call for “immediate cessation of military action on both sides”.161 
 Resolution 1860 was largely drafted by Great Britain. During the war, Britain had 
coordinated its position closely with the EU. The British position closely resembled that of the 
EU, calling for an immediate ceasefire.162 However, for some time, it did not come to a vote 
in the UNSC as the US was unfavourable to the draft Resolution, stating that Israel had the 
right to defend itself. In parallel with the British sponsored draft Resolution, France was 
conducting its own diplomacy. On 6 January 2009, President Sarkozy and the Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak proposed a plan to end the crisis. It called for an immediate 
ceasefire, an immediate resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks to prevent a repetition of 
violence and it called for Palestinian reconciliation. 163 Just before Resolution 1860 would be 
adopted, France tried to delay the adoption to provide more time for the French-Egyptian 
proposal.164 This generated considerable frustration among the Security Council members.  
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 French attempts to become a mediator did also cause considerable frustrations within 
the EU. During the second half of 2008, France had presented itself as a mediator in the 
escalating conflict. However, when the EU presidency passed to the Czech Republic in 
January 2009, Sarkozy refused to let the Czechs resume the mediator role. According to 
several French officials, the French believed that the Czech Republic was not up for the job  
as it lacked the resources and influence.165 In an interview, the French finance minister, Eric 
Woerth, stated that president Sarkozy was “the only one capable of taking an initiative like 
this”.166 This resulted in much overlap as both President Sarkozy and the EU send separate 
diplomatic missions to a peace summit in Egypt. This form of independent diplomacy was 
highly typical for Sarkozy. During the Lebanon War of 2006 and the Russian-Georgian 
conflict over South Ossetia, Sarkozy also acted as a mediator.  
The events around the Gaza War of 2008/2009 clearly indicated that France wanted to 
act independently. By presenting itself as being an independent and highly visible mediator, 
France gained grandeur. France’s refusal to give the Czechs the leading role in the mediations 
and the separate French-Egyptian peace proposal show that France continues to pursue an 
independent, highly visible foreign policy. Moreover, it shows that the British position moved 
closer to that of the EU as it proposed Resolution 1860, thereby directly opposing US policy. 
Germany on the other hand continued to be a close supporter of Israel by defending Israeli 
actions.  
The period from the CFSP’s inception to its redefinition with the Lisbon Treaty has 
witnessed only limited convergence. During this period, Germany remained a staunch 
supporter of the Israeli case. France on the other hand remained a firm ally of the Palestinians, 
not in the least to maintain its independent and visible foreign policy. However, the one 
striking difference was the UK’s during the 2008-2009 Gaza War in which the UK 
significantly converged on the main EU position.  
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The Lisbon Treaty and the MEPP 
 
The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in 2009, introduced significant changes to the 
CFSP. The first part of this chapter will describe the main innovations brought about by the 
Lisbon Treaty. The second part of this chapter will investigate if these innovations have 
helped Europeanize the foreign policies of the Big three by looking at their response towards 
the Palestinian bid for full UN membership in 2011.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty: in search of greater coherence 
The introduction of the CFSP in 1993 and the position of HR in 1997 had created many 
different actors which represented the EU on the world stage. At the top level, the EU was 
either represented by the President of the Commission or the government holding the 
presidency. On the ministerial level, the EU was either represented by the Commissioner for 
External Affairs, by the Foreign Minister of the member state holding the Presidency or the 
HR. This complicated decision-making and undermined the EU’s external representation. 
Especially when issues fell under shared competences. Therefore, the member states sought to 
increase the visibility of the EU on the world stage and make the EU’s foreign policy more 
efficient and coherent.  
Several important steps towards greater coherence and efficiency were taken with the  
Lisbon Treaty. First of all, it introduced a non-rotating President of the European Council. 
Furthermore, it greatly expanded the competences of the HR. The position of HR was merged 
with that of the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood 
Policy. Moreover, the HR acts as Vice President of the Commission, creating a ‘triple-hatted’ 
role. The HR represents the EU on the world stage, chairs the European Council and 
coordinates the work of the Commissioners responsible for external relation portfolios. OIn 
this, the HR is assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS was 
established on 1 December 2010 and provided the EU with its own diplomatic network. It 
transformed the existing Commission Representations abroad into official European Union 
Delegations.167  
However, the delegation of competences to the HR did not go hand in hand with a 
transfer of decision-making power to the supranational level. Decision-making is still based 
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on unanimity. 168  With no mechanism to make member states comply with decisions, 
execution remains dependent on the political will of member states. Additionally, the creation 
of a full-time chair for the Foreign Affairs Council has not automatically increased the EU’s 
ability to reach consensus on foreign policy issues. This is also very dependent on the HR’s 
standing with the member states. According to Müller, HR Catherine Ashton (2009-2014) did 
not have the trust and support of important member states. This severely hampered her ability 
to generate consensus amongst the member states.169 
 The EEAS has a central role in the coordination of foreign policy. It has to deliver 
foreign policy to the supranational institutions (horizontal coordination) and has to take into 
account the positions of the 28 member states (vertical coordination). It therefore has the 
potential to play a significant role in the Europeanization of foreign policy. First of all, it can 
promote the convergence of national policy preferences (downloading dimension). Secondly, 
a third of the EEAS diplomatic corps is recruited from national member states’ existing 
diplomatic personnel. 170  Moreover, national governments have insisted that national 
diplomats head European diplomatic delegations abroad. 171  This helps member states to 
upload their national preferences to the European level, thereby using the EEAS as an 
instrument of national power.172  Thirdly, convergence may also occur through the cross-
fertilization of national foreign policy ideas. Finally, convergence may happen through the 
process of elite socialization. Extensive coordination and cooperation between national 
diplomats can create a new esprit de corps which is European instead of national. However, 
as the EEAS is relatively new, it is not clear whether this is already occurring or not.173 
However, there are also limits to the EEAS’ ability to coordinate national foreign policy. First 
of all, some national Ministries of Foreign Affairs view the EEAS as a competitor. They 
therefore prefer to conduct diplomacy on their own.174 Secondly, some member states refuse 
to cooperate on certain foreign policy issues as they see it as a competence reserved for the 
member state.175  
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The response to the Palestinian bid for UN membership 
When Hamas and Fatah formed a unity government in April 2011, the Peace Process was all 
but dead. The US-sponsored peace negotiations had collapsed in September and it was 
unlikely that is would be revived soon. 176  However, the start of popular revolts against 
autocratic regimes across the Middle East and Northern Africa, the Arab Spring, had given 
new impetus to the Palestinian’s drive for an end to the conflict. In order to accomplish the 
latter, the Palestinians tried to force a breakthrough by declaring their intention to request full 
UN membership by September 2011. This would imply UN recognition of Palestine as a state. 
The Palestinian plan evoked a lot of commotion. While giving Palestine a full-fledged 
membership of the UN did not signify the de facto establishment of a Palestinian state, it 
would certainly give Palestine more legitimacy. Moreover, it allowed them to participate in 
General Assembly debates and it would allow the Palestinian’s to join international agencies 
such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
Membership of the ICC would enable the Palestinians to file charges against Israel on 
grounds of war crimes and crimes against humanity.177  Israel does not acknowledge the 
jurisdiction of the ICC and has therefore no legal obligation to adhere to verdicts of the ICC. 
However, a negative verdict would further isolate Israel internationally. Therefore, Israel 
vigorously tried to prevent this from happening.  
 Israel was backed in this by the US. However, the Big Three became increasingly 
concerned with the lack of progress and American inaction in the Peace Process. After the US 
exercised its veto on the ‘draft United Nations resolution on Israeli settlements’ of 18 
February 2011, both France and the UK signalled that they would support the Palestine bid 
for full UN membership if there was still no progress in the Peace Process by September 
2011.178 Germany, in turn, pressed Israel for concessions. Young attributes this remarkable 
convergence of positions to the Arab Spring. These popular revolts “appeared to have 
propelled European governments into a more proactive stance”.179 However, it can also be 
interpreted as a tactic to put pressure on the Israeli government to compromise and to return to 
the negotiating table. Any hopes of achieving this were dashed during a visit by Prime 
Minister Netanyahu to Berlin in April 2011. During his visit, Chancellor Merkel assured him 
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that Germany would vote against any unilateral move by the Palestinians to attain full UN 
membership. This ended any illusion that the Big Three were a united front.180 
 This was a serious problem for the EU. A failure to vote as a unified bloc in the vote 
on full Palestinian membership to the UN would not only undermine the EU’s previous 
declarations on the issue but it would hamper the EU’s wish to become a credible actor in 
international affairs in general and in the Peace Process in particular. Therefore, HR Ashton 
tried to unify the position of the 27 member states. This proved very difficult as the member 
states’ positions on the subject diverged substantially.181 In addition to this, her efforts were 
more than once undermined by the French who stuck to their own ideas about the Peace 
Process. In June, the French Foreign Affairs Minister, Alain Juppé, said that France was 
prepared to transform a planned international donor conference for Palestine in Paris into a 
“broader political conference involving the negotiation process”.182 By upgrading the Paris 
donor conference, France would put itself into the spotlight. However, both the US and Israel 
were negative towards this plan. In late August, France broke ranks again when President 
Sarkozy publicly presented his own proposal to the MEPP, thereby calling for an UN observer 
state status for Palestine. In addition to this, he called on the member states of the EU to 
“speak with a single voice”.183 This independent and uncoordinated move was not appreciated 
by other EU actors and damaged France’s standing in the EU. 
These decisions clearly reflect France’s desire to maintain a leadership position in the 
EU. Moreover, they showed France’s desire to maintain an independent foreign policy, 
thereby improving France’s visibility on the world stage. In the face of European disunity, 
France decided to press for a solution without European help. This clearly shows that France 
sees European cooperation in foreign affairs as a tool for France. In addition to increasing 
France’s grandeur, commentators have also stated that Sarkozy’s latest remark served 
domestic goals. With Presidential elections drawing near, the statehood issue could deliver 
him additional votes.184 Sarkozy’s statement could not only deliver him many votes from 
France’s Muslim population, but also from the French electorate in general. A poll conducted 
by the Institut français d'opinion publique just prior to the UN vote showed that 82% of the 
French population supported Palestinian statehood.185  
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In the end, it did not come to a vote in the UNSC. When the Palestinians submitted the 
resolution to the UNSC, it failed to get the required 9 out of 15 votes. In the face of an 
American veto, the UK and France abstained from supporting the resolution. While, the 
resolution was not put to a vote, the vote on Palestinian membership to the UN  Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in late October 2011 indicates how divided 
the Big Three were on the issue. Germany voted against, France was in favour and the UK 
abstained.186 
The vote in the UN General Assembly on 29 November 2012 to upgrade Palestine’s 
status to that of ‘non-observer state’ however shows a remarkable change in the position of 
Germany. Instead of voting against, Germany abstained. This came as a big shock for Israel. 
Nonetheless, Germany’s abstention should not be seen as a fundamental change in German 
policy on the MEPP. Germany’s moral commitment to the state of Israel remains intact. This 
was clear in Germany’s choice to refrain from selling submarines to Egypt. Moreover, 
Germany continued to support Israel’s position in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear 
program.187 Commentators state that Merkel had become annoyed with Israel’s unwillingness 
to make concessions towards the Palestinians. 
The issue of full UN membership for Palestine shows that there is almost no 
convergence in the policies of the Big Three. However, in matters which are less vital to their 
national foreign policies, such as Palestinian membership to UNESCO, considerable 
convergence has occurred. It could therefore be argued that Europeanization has only 
occurred in policy area’s which do not endanger national interests. However, it is difficult to 
attribute this instance of  Europeanization to the strengthening of European foreign policy 
tools by the Lisbon Treaty.  
  
 
  
                                                           
186
 EUobserver (2011). UNESCO vote highlights EU split on Palestine.  
187
 Der Spiegel International (2012). An affront from Berlin: Israeli-German relations strained after abstention.  
50 
 
Conclusion 
  
This thesis has tried to determine whether the foreign policies of France, the UK and 
Germany towards the MEPP have been Europeanized since the inception of the CFSP. If this 
would be the case, their positions on the MEPP would have showed convergence. On first 
sight, this has not been the case. The policy decisions of France, the UK and Germany can 
largely be seen as a continuation of national policies. These national policies have been 
heavily influenced by historical factors. So much that they have become ingrained in each 
state’s strategic culture. 
For France’s foreign policy, the pursuit of grandeur through the politique arabe 
remains central in France’s foreign policy towards the MEPP. In this pursuit of grandeur, the 
EU has been of great importance. As France’s power and influence in the region waned, 
Europe became more and more an important channel for French influence. In line with this, 
France has tried to claim a leadership position in the EU’s conduct regarding the MEPP. A 
leadership position would align Europe’s position towards the MEPP more with that of France. 
Moreover, this leadership would grant France additional grandeur. A clear example of this is 
President Chirac’s Cairo Speech in which he claimed to speak on behalf of the EU. 
Nevertheless, in the event that France is unable to upload its national preferences to the 
European level, France is not afraid to fall back on her national resources. French efforts to 
delay Resolution 1860 in order to offer more time for its own peace proposal is clear evidence 
of this. It convincingly shows that France’s diplomacy towards the MEPP does not differ from 
past policy, thereby showing almost no signs of Europeanization. While France’s position did 
not change, it did manage to upload some of its key positions to the European level.   
 In contrast to France, the UK’s foreign policy towards the MEPP does show 
considerable Europeanization. A clear indicator of this is Great Britain’s divergence from 
American policy on several key issues in the MEPP. Initially, Great Britain coordinated its 
policy towards the MEPP closely with the US. Britain’s efforts to water down the mandate of 
the EU’s Special Envoy to the Middle East and the British boycott of the Hamas government 
before the EU could react clearly indicate this. However, in the last few years, Great Britain 
has shown increased willingness to align its policy towards the MEPP more closely with that 
of the EU. The British draft Resolution 1860, which was in opposition to US policy, shows 
that Great Britain is willing to stir away from US policy and align itself with the EU. This can 
be considered as a tentative move to align British foreign policy towards the Peace Process 
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more with that of Europe. Additionally, the British threat to recognize Palestine and Great 
Britain’s abstention during the vote on UNESCO membership for Palestine show that Great 
Britain is not following US policy as closely as before.  
Germany’s foreign policy has shown signs of Europeanization as well. As the 
mechanisms of the CFSP are slowly maturing, Germany was confronted with opportunities 
and challenges. The CFSP has enabled Germany to support decisions which would be 
unacceptable when taken unilaterally. The call for an immediate ceasefire in the 2008-2009 
Gaza War would have met considerable domestic opposition if Germany had called for it on 
its own. The CFSP has also forced Germany to assume a greater role within the Peace Process. 
To prevent the shaping of a European policy which is detrimental to Germany’s policy 
towards the Peace Process, Germany has to act. Germany’s cooperation with Great Britain to 
water down the mandate of the Special Envoy to the Middle East is evidence of this. 
Overall, there are signs of Europeanization in all three member states. Nevertheless, 
there is considerable difference between that of France on the one hand and that of the UK 
and Germany on the other hand. It could be argued that France exhibits Europeanization 
which is predominantly of an uploading kind whereas that of the UK and Germany is 
primarily of a downloading nature.  
However, while each of the Big Three are willing to cooperate in the CFSP, it should 
be stressed that their self-image and history play significant roles. French exceptionalism, 
British Transatlanticism and Germany’s moral debt will continue to dominate their policies 
towards the Peace Process in the near future and beyond. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the EU often managed to come up with a common position which balanced the policies of the 
Big Three. The CFSP is still relatively young and important institutions such as the HR and 
EEAS still need to mature and further define themselves. A more detailed study of their 
influence on the Europeanization of foreign policy would be recommended. Overall, while 
partial Europeanization of foreign policy towards the Peace Process can be discerned, 
ingrained policies continue to have decisive influence.      
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